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Summary 
This paper investigates the performance of Germany’s three-pillar banking system in 
providing financial services nationwide, regarding different outreach indicators. At the 
federal state level, bank outreach shows South-North and West-East gaps. Combining 
regional and bank data at the district level for 2005, we examine the determinants of 
geographic and demographic branch penetration of the regional savings and cooperative 
banks. Both banking groups provide a larger branch penetration in more wealthy regions, 
but maintain a larger number of branches per inhabitant in less densely populated regions, 
easing access to retail banking services. With their comparatively large branch penetration 
in less wealthy regions, public savings banks help to reduce regional economic disparities. 
The branch penetration of both banking groups increases with the share of elder people 
and bank size in a region. Because of their public mission to serve all regions, public 
savings banks foster competition.  
Zusammenfassung 
Geographische und demographische Reichweite von Banken:  
Empirische Evidenz für Deutschlands Dreisäulen-Bankensystem 
Der Beitrag untersucht die flächendeckende Bereitstellung von Finanzdienstleistungen 
durch das deutschen Dreisäulen-Bankensystem, wobei unterschiedliche Indikatoren der 
Reichweite betrachtet werden. Auf der Ebene der Bundesländer zeigen sich Süd-Nord und 
West-Ost-Gefälle. Durch Verknüpfung von Regional- und Bankdaten auf Kreisebene für 
das Jahr 2005 werden die Determinanten der geographischen und demographischen Bank-
stellenpenetration der regional tätigen Sparkassen und Genossenschaftsbanken untersucht. 
Beide Bankengruppen zeigen eine höhere Bankstellenversorgung in wirtschaftsstärkeren 
Regionen, unterhalten aber mehr Bankstellen pro Einwohner in dünner besiedelten Regio-
nen, womit sie den Zugang zu Finanzdienstleistungen erleichtern. Mit ihrer relativ großen 
Bankstellenpenetration in wirtschaftsschwächeren Regionen tragen die Sparkassen zur 
Überwindung regionaler ökonomischer Disparitäten bei. Die Bankstellenversorgung bei-
der Regionalbankgruppen steigt mit dem Anteil älterer Menschen und der Bankgröße in 
einer Region. Durch ihren öffentlichen Auftrag, alle Regionen zu versorgen, tragen die 
Sparkassen zur Sicherung des Wettbewerbs bei. 
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Geographic and Demographic Bank Outreach: Evidence from Germany’s 
Three-Pillar Banking System 
I.  Introduction 
The performance of financial systems has been usually measured by variables of 
financial sector depth and banking sector structure and performance, which are expected 
to determine the efficiency of capital allocation and thus economic development and 
growth. While most of the literature has focused on financial sector depth, measured by 
the ratio of private sector debt to GDP, and its economic impact in developing economies 
(Levine 2005), the quality of financial systems in industrialized economies has not been 
investigated comprehensively so far. Research on indicators to measure the quality with 
which financial systems perform their main functions (Hartmann et al. 2006) focuses on 
efficiency measures, neglecting aspects of access or distribution. Financial sector breadth 
or outreach, measured by access of the population to banking services, or geographic and 
demographic distribution, has only recently been put on the research agenda by the World 
Bank (Beck et al. 2006, Claessens 2006). 
Concerns about unbanking or unequal access to banking services in developed countries 
have grown recently, because an ever more sophisticated and efficient financial system 
seems to go along with the risk of excluding an increasing number of people from 
financial services (Anderloni et al. 2007). This is driven by growing competitive pressure 
in the banking market due to globalization and technological change. It has led to 
profound structural changes through mergers, consolidation of branch networks and 
privatization of state-owned banks in most industrialized countries. These changes are 
likely to impair the provision of financial services to less profitable and poorly populated 
areas and to less profitable retail customer segments such as poor households and SMEs 
(small and medium-sized enterprises). Banking consolidation may reduce access of SMEs 
to finance, if large banks are less prone to lend to SMEs or soft information of relationship 
lending is lost in mergers and acquisitions.  
The effects of technological change on access to finance are ambiguous: on the one 
hand, electronic distribution channels and progress in credit scoring technology have 
reduced prices and increased the geographical extent of retail banking markets.
1 On the 
                                                           





other hand, replacing bank branches by direct banking channels excludes customers who 
need personal contact.
2 Since branches are still the most preferred distribution channel of 
retail banking services, many banks in the EU increasingly rely on them to target their 
customers’ needs for personal advice. Retail banking constitutes over half of the total 
banking activity and generates 2% of EU GDP annually in gross income (ECB 2007, p. 
39). Therefore, providing access to retail banking services is of great importance. 
The German financial system is unique for two reasons: it is the prototype of a bank-
based system, and still relies on the three-pillar commercial banking system composed of 
private banks, public savings banks and cooperative banks. This system has been 
abandoned by many European countries through privatizing their savings banks. 
Even if the state guarantees of the German savings banks were abolished in 2005 
because they constituted state aid incompatible with the EC Treaty, these banks are still in 
public hand and play a major role in the banking sector. In March 2008, savings banks 
accounted for 34%, private banks for 30% and cooperative banks for 12% of total banking 
assets (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008a, p. 24).
3 In the retail banking segment, the savings 
banks play an even larger role (Bresler et al. 2007, Mullineux/Terberger 2006). In contrast 
to the nationwide operating big private banks, savings and cooperative banks are regional 
banks. Cooperative banks follow the non-profit mission to support the business of their 
members. Savings banks have the public mission to provide safe and interest-bearing 
investment opportunities and access to loans to the local population and SMEs. Their 
public mandate and ownership are economically justified, if there is a market failure 
through under-provision of financial services by private and cooperative banks. The often 
raised claim that because of the public pillar, the German banking sector is overbanked 
and unprofitable (Koetter et al. 2006), is premature. The lower profitability of German 
banks compared to their UK and US counterparts may signal a higher intensity of 
competition and economic welfare (Neumann/Reichel 2006, KfW 2005, Sachverständi-
genrat 2008). The comparatively low concentration and high branch density of the 
German banking market may imply broader access to financial services.  
                                                           
2 Internet banking usage declines with age and increases with education and wealth (ECB 2007, p. 44; 
Neuberger 2007; Neuberger/Lehmann 1998). 
3 The savings banks pillar comprises 444 municipal savings banks and 12 Landesbanken, the private bank 
pillar comprises five big banks (Deutsche Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG, Hypovereinsbank AG, Commerzbank 
AG, Deutsche Postbank AG), branches of foreign banks, regional and other banks, and the cooperative bank 





While cross-country evidence shows a large outreach of the German banking sector at 
the national level, a comprehensive study at the regional level is missing so far. Economic 
wealth is unevenly distributed in Germany, with prosperous, economically growing 
regions concentrated in the south, and poor, economically declining regions in the north 
and east. Demographic change through population aging and migration of young people to 
prosperous regions enhances regional disparities. This has caused political concern, given 
that the German population has a legal entitlement to equal living standards. To achieve 
this goal, a nationwide provision of bank services may play an important role. 
Most of the literature on bank sector outreach is empirical with focus on cross-country 
evidence (Peachey/Roe 2006, Beck et al. 2006, Claessens 2006, Anderloni et al. 2007). 
Recent research examines the welfare effects of Germany’s three-pillar banking system 
theoretically (Neumann/Reichel 2006, Hakenes/Schnabel 2006). The outreach of savings 
banks in East Germany has been investigated empirically (Wengler 2006). The present 
paper provides an overview of the literature, presents hypotheses on determinants of bank 
outreach and tests them using recent banking and regional data for Germany. We provide 
descriptive statistics for the outreach of German banks at the federal, federal state, and 
district level, and use multivariate analyses to examine determinants of branch penetration 
of savings and cooperative banks at the district level. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an overview of the 
conceptual framework and measurement of bank outreach. Section III reviews the 
theoretical literature and hypotheses to be tested, and section IV reviews previous 
evidence. Section V presents univariate analyses, and section VI multivariate analyses of 
outreach in the German banking market. Section VII concludes. 
II.  Conceptual framework and measurement of bank outreach  
The term banking sector outreach refers to the access to banking services and their use 
by households and firms (Beck et al. 2006). There are various dimensions to access: 
availability of financial services, cost of access, and range, type and quality of financial 
services offered (Claessens 2006). Access is not synonymous to use. Economic agents 
might decide not to use accessible financial services, either for socio-cultural reasons, or 
because opportunity costs are too high (Beck et al. 2006). The counterpart of access is 
exclusion. Financial exclusion may be caused by (1) ‘geographic limitations’ due to 




economic limitations’ when financial services appear inaccessible to specific income, 
social or ethnic groups, or (3) ‘limitations of opportunity’, when new or small firms with 
profitable projects are credit rationed because of lack of information and collateral 
(Beck/de la Torre 2006, Anderloni/Carluccio 2007, p. 9).  
A broad banking sector outreach is important for economic and social development. 
Financial market imperfections cause credit constraints particularly for poor households 
and small or young entrepreneurs, which are opaque and lack collateral. Broadening their 
access to banks would ease the financing of high-return investment projects, alleviating 
poverty and spurring economic growth. Access of talented newcomers to financial 
services is crucial for Schumpeterian competition and development through the entry of 
new and innovative firms. Access to finance may even be considered as a basic need such 
as clean water, health services and education (Peachy/Roe 2006).
4 However, it is unclear 
whether there is a public goods argument for extending access more broadly. Some 
households or firms may not demand financial services at the prevailing costs or may not 
be credit-worthy, and some banks may not wish to provide financial services to all 
customers, because it is not profitable or too risky (Claessens 2006, Beck/de la Torre 
2006). Voluntary self-exclusion does not constitute a problem of access, unless it results 
from unduly low levels of financial literacy or financial market discrimination.  
Evidence on financial exclusion is scarce, because it is hard to measure, and data on the 
use of financial services by households and firms is limited (Claessens 2006). As an 
analytical tool to measure financial sector outreach, Beck and de la Torre (2006) 
suggested the access possibilities frontier as the intersection of potential supply and 
demand. Potential supply denotes the maximum outreach that can be provided given the 
institutional framework, macroeconomic environment, or technology. Potential demand is 
the demand predicted by economic factors. Starting from this frontier, there are three 
access problems: a lack of demand due to voluntary self-exclusion, a gap between actual 
and potential supply due to incomplete competition or other supply-side constraints, and a 
frontier that is too low in international comparisons because of the state variables 
(Beck/de la Torre 2006, p. 47). This framework can be used for the debate on how to 
expand bank outreach by private solutions or public policies. 
 
                                                           




To measure bank outreach, several proxy indicators have been used in the literature (see 
Table 1). Proxy (1) measures access to and use of bank accounts. Full access may be 
reached, if the number of accounts per adult is above 0.5 (Peachy/Roe 2006, p.16). The 
penetration of banks’ physical outlets (branches, ATMs) is measured by (2)-(5). While 
higher geographic branch and ATM penetration indicate smaller distance and thus easier 
geographic access, higher demographic branch and ATM penetration indicate easier 
access because of fewer potential clients per outlet. The use of loans and deposits is 
measured by (6)-(9). A higher demographic loan or deposit penetration indicates larger 
use, and higher loan- or deposit-income-ratios signal that these services may only be 
affordable to larger enterprises or wealthier individuals. The loan-income-ratio is about 2 
in rich countries, but above 8 in poor countries (Beck et al. 2006, pp. 8). Alternative 
measures of deposit penetration are the deposit-GDP-ratio and the cash-deposit-ratio. 
According to Peachy and Roe (2006, p. 15), an economy has reached full access, if the 
deposit-GDP-ratio is 100% or the cash-deposit-ratio is below 20%. This measures the 
development of the financial system rather than deposit penetration. For the indicators (2)-
(9), a country may be considered approaching full access, if its outreach indicator lies 
above the mean value in developed countries (Beck and de la Torre 2006). 
Table1 : 
Indicators of banking sector outreach 
Indicator Measurement 
(1) Bank accounts per  adult  Number of bank accounts per adult 
(2) Geographic branch penetration  Number of branches per 1,000 km² 
(3) Demographic branch penetration  Number of branches per 100,000 people 
(4) Geographic ATM penetration  Number of bank ATMs per 1,000 km² 
(5) Demographic ATM penetration  Number of bank ATMs per 100,000 
people 
(6) Demographic loan penetration  Number of loans per 100,000 people 
(7) Loan-income-ratio  Average size of loans to GDP per capita 
(8) Demographic deposit penetration  Number of deposits per 100,000 people 
(9) Deposit-income-ratio  
(or deposit-GDP-ratio) 
Average size of deposits to GDP per 
capita (or total bank deposits to GDP) 
(10) Cash-deposit-ratio  Cash in circulation to total bank deposits 
Source: own composition, Beck at al. (2006), Peachy/Roe (2006). 
Even if these outreach indicators are easy to measure, they have shortcomings: they are 
crude quantity-based indicators that ignore new delivery channels of financial services 
and costs of accessing and using banking services. When applied to a country, they 




population and GDP per capita. In most countries, however, bank branches and ATMs are 
concentrated in urban or prosperous regions, and the size of loans and deposits may be 
unevenly distributed (Beck et al. 2006). Therefore, it is necessary to measure banking 
outreach also on the regional level. 
III.  Theory and hypotheses  
Hypotheses about determinants of bank outreach can be derived from the concept of the 
access possibilities frontier and microeconomics of supply and demand. On the supply 
side, access to banking services depends on the bank’s strategy and cost management as 
well as on state variables such as market size, macroeconomic fundamentals, available 
technology, per capita income, intensity of competition and the legal and institutional 
environment. On the demand side, price and income level are the main economic 
determinants of the use of financial services. For a given price and income level, actual 
demand may be lower than potential demand because of self-exclusion arising from non 
economic reasons as financial illiteracy, ethnic or religious factors (Beck/de la Torre 
2006). Since supply-side theories play the major role in explaining banking sector 
outreach in developed countries, we will focus on them. 
For the supply of banking services, fixed production costs play a large role. At the level 
of the firm, fixed costs arise from the brick-and-mortar branch network, computer and 
accounting systems, legal services, and security arrangements. Fixed costs also arise at the 
level of individual transactions and clients: the costs of an individual payments or savings 
transaction are independent of the value of the transaction, and the costs of maintaining an 
account for a client are independent on the number and size of that client’s transactions 
(Beck/de la Torre 2006, p. 7).  
The higher are the fixed costs at the firm or branch level, the higher are the economies 
of scale that can be reaped by an expansion of output and the lower will be the number of 
banks or bank branches in the long-run market equilibrium. This has been shown within a 
spatial competition model of banks that compete on deposit and loan markets (Chiappori 
et al. 1995). Hence, fixed costs constitute an important limitation to geographic outreach 
in the provision of retail banking services. At the level of the client, economies of scale 
can be seized by raising the number or volume of transactions. This implies that low-
income clients that need small and few payment and savings transactions may not be 




exclusion of these customers implies smaller demographic outreach.  
Generally, the higher are the fixed costs relative to market size or individual demand, 
the lower is the efficient number of banks, bank branches or clients served. Thus, outreach 
depends negatively on fixed costs, but positively on the size of the market or bank. 
Moreover, the outreach of an individual bank decreases as the number of competitors 
rises, reducing residual demand. Banking consolidation to reap economies of scale may 
increase monopolistic market power, restricting output and outreach. On the other hand, 
gains from monopoly power may ease the financing of a larger branch network. 
These production cost arguments neglect the role of banks to reduce problems of 
incomplete information by advising and monitoring customers. A reduction of the branch 
network involves opportunity costs through losses of customers or profits from providing 
personal contact and advice, and higher risk costs through less monitoring of borrowers. 
Although the use of electronic banking channels and transaction lending technologies has 
increased for standardized banking products and wholesale customers, the branch network 
with provision of informational and advisory services is still the most preferred 
distribution channel in retail banking markets (ECB 2007). It is crucial for providing 
relationship banking services by maintaining proximity to clients. This applies above all 
to market segments with high information asymmetry like SMEs and households, where 
banks perform a monitoring function (Diamond 1994). Under relationship lending, the 
bank relies on soft information gathered through direct contact of the loan officer with the 
borrower and its local community over time (Berger/Udell 2006). This lending technology 
addresses the problem of information opacity, in contrast to transaction lending based on 
“hard” quantitative data. Theoretically, the optimal geographic outreach would be given at 
the point where the marginal costs of increasing the branch network and information 
services are equal to the marginal gains from a reduction of transaction costs and 
information asymmetry.  
Small, regional banks are likely to have a comparative advantage in gathering and 
verifying soft information, because they are closer to their customers in local markets 
(Agarwal/Hauswald 2007, Hauswald/Marquez 2006). Soft information is difficult to 
quantify and transmit through the communication channels of large organizations 
(Berger/Udell 2002, 2003), which in turn may have an advantage in transaction lending. A 
centralized hierarchical bank offers greater incentives to employ hard information (Stein 




for small, decentralized banks compared to large, hierarchical banks, which specialize on 
wholesale customers. Employing a model of banking competition with different 
organizational structures, Degryse et al. (2006) predict that a bank’s geographic outreach 
decreases when rival banks are more hierarchically organized and lending decisions are 
communicated more swiftly at rival banks. Banking consolidation may impair access of 
SMEs to finance, because large banks are less prone to lend to SMEs or soft information 
of relationship lending is lost in mergers and acquisitions. 
Regarding social welfare, the supply of profit maximizing banks involves an under-
provision of financial services in a region, if positive externalities drive a wedge between 
the social and private marginal benefits from broadening outreach. A positive intra-
regional externality is likely to result from investment finance within the region, which 
fosters regional entrepreneurial activity (Hakenes/Schnabel 2006, p. 2). Employing a 
model with credit rationing and heterogeneous regions, Hakenes and Schnabel (2006) 
show that in a financially integrated economy without public banks, there is a capital drain 
from poor to rich regions, because lenders will transfer their funds to the regions with the 
highest endowments, where they obtain the highest interest rates. While private banks 
cannot improve upon this allocation, a public bank can prevent the capital drain if it is 
sufficiently subsidized to offer a competitive deposit rate. Obeying a regional principle, it 
internalizes the intra-regional externality from investing within the region. To some 
extent, the same result can be achieved by a cooperative bank that endogenously 
establishes a regional principle by lending only to its members. In contrast to public 
banks, cooperative banks cannot internalize positive externalities of production on the 
non-entrepreneurs and mobilize funds from them. However, they are better than public 
banks in ensuring access to capital for the poor and moral-hazard-prone industries within 
a region.  
Using a Cournot oligopoly model, Neumann and Reichel (2006) show that the presence 
of a non profit maximizing public or cooperative bank has positive welfare effects by 
increasing equilibrium output to the competitive level, compared to the Cournot 
equilibrium level of competition between private banks. An equilibrium with both 
banking groups is only viable, if the average cost of the private bank is lower than that of 
the public or cooperative bank. The private bank’s cost advantage is likely to result from 
its smaller branch network and economies of scale due to larger firm size and centralized 




a change in demand, because average costs rise (fall) less rapidly as output expands 
(decreases), compared to the case of a public or cooperative bank. This implies that 
private, profit maximizing banks retreat more rapidly from regions with declining demand 
than non profit maximizing banks. 
Thus, Germany’s three-pillar banking system with state-owned banks may be justified 
by the failure of private banks and to some extent also of cooperative banks 
(Hakenes/Schnabel 2006) to supply a socially optimal outreach. Because German savings 
banks have a public mission to serve all regions and customers beyond the goal of 
economic efficiency, we expect that their outreach is broader and less dependent on the 
external factors affecting the outreach of a pure profit maximizing bank (Wengler 2006). 
However, because of the regional principle, they are more dependent on the situation of 
their business district, with which they form a ‘common destiny’. Therefore, economic 
wealth and population density may have a large impact on the outreach of public savings 
banks, as long as they strive for economic efficiency.  
Summarizing, we derive the following hypotheses: 
–  H1: Bank outreach increases with economic wealth in a region (profit or efficiency goal). 
–  H2: Bank outreach increases with population density in a region (profit or efficiency goal). 
–  H3: Bank outreach decreases with the number of competitors in a region (profit goal).  
–  H4: Bank outreach increases with the size of the bank in a region (profit or efficiency 
goal). 
–  H5: The outreach of small, decentralized banks (large, centralized banks) increases 
(decreases) with the demand for retail banking services in a region (profit or efficiency 
goal). 
–  H6: Public savings banks provide a broader outreach than private and cooperative banks 
(public mission). 
IV.  Previous evidence  
Most of the previous studies investigate bank outreach on the national level for cross-
sections of countries. They show large differences between poor and rich economies, 
consistent with H1. In a nutshell, the percentage rate of access in poorer developing 




industrial economies (Peachey/Roe 2006, p. 14). There are large variations of outreach 
both within the group of developing and transition economies and the group of advanced 
industrial countries. Among the latter, the relatively urbanized social market economies of 
Europe (the Scandinavian countries, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain) and Japan 
have the largest bank outreach with access above 95%. The Anglo-Saxon market 
economies of the UK, US and Australia rank behind. The lowest outreach is found in 
Ireland and the more southerly EU states except Spain, where average access seems to be 
reduced by a larger share of rural regions and greater regional income inequality. 
However, the problem of geographic exclusion is not restricted to these countries. Across 
the developed world there is growing concern that commercial banks are concentrating 
their outreach on more profitable customers and regions, because the private benefits of 
reaching the last 10% of customers are limited. In line with H6, savings banks and other 
socially committed retail banks are by far the largest suppliers of accessible accounts in 
developing and transition economies, where they provide some three-quarters of all such 
accounts. Even in advanced economies, they are often the only banking institutions left in 
areas of geographic exclusion, and which provide services accessible to the socially and 
economically excluded (Peachey/Roe 2006).  
The first attempt at directly investigating the determinants of different indicators of bank 
outreach and their influence on the use of banking services has been made by Beck et al. 
(2006) for a sample of 99 developed and developing countries. They find that countries 
with greater bank outreach experience a significantly larger share of households with bank 
accounts and small firms with bank loans, and significantly less severe firm financing 
obstacles. Outreach is positively related to the overall level of economic development, 
supporting H1. The degree of government ownership of banks exerts a negative influence 
on the branch and ATM penetration, inconsistent with H6. However, this result may be 
biased, because the dataset excludes most of the savings banks in developing and 
transition economies, which account for half of all accessible accounts (Peachey/Roe 
2006, p. 30). 
Studies investigating regional variations of bank outreach in developed countries 
confirm the hypotheses that private banks retreat from rural and under-populated regions 
and urban areas with economic difficulties (H1 and H2). This is due to increasing cost-
pressure on banks driven by rising competition and the progress of e-banking technologies 




and US have experienced a process of ‘flight to quality’ and financial infrastructure 
withdrawal from socially and economically disadvantaged areas. The emerged spaces of 
financial exclusion are associated with economic decline and social problems, 
contributing to uneven development (Leyshon/Thrift 1995, Mullineux/Terberger 2006, 
Anderloni/Carluccio 2007). 
The effects of banking competition on outreach are ambiguous. On the one hand, studies 
for developed and developing countries find positive effects of banking competition (e.g. 
measured by foreign bank entry) on outreach, especially regarding access of SMEs to 
loans and other services (Beck et al. 2004, p. 640, Claessens 2006, p. 227, Peachey/Roe 
2006, p. 36). On the other hand, the growing intensity of competition in the EU banking 
markets has made cross-subsidization impossible, which was used to finance the majority 
of loss-making current accounts by profitable ones (Peachey/Roe 2006, p. 36). It has 
caused consolidations of banks and branch networks, with negative effects on small 
business finance. Even if the empirical evidence for advanced countries is mixed, it 
confirms that larger banks hold relatively fewer small business loans than small banks and 
that banks reassess their portfolios after mergers, inducing termination of lending 
relationships. At least mergers between large banks seem to have negative effects on small 
firm finance (for reviews see Bonaccorsi di Patti/Gobbi 2007, 2003, Sachverständigenrat 
2005).  
Germany belongs to the countries with the highest access to banking services, measured 
by different outreach indicators (Peachey/Roe 2006, pp. 30, Koetter et al. 2006, Bresler et 
al. 2007, Sachverständigenrat 2008). However, there are large regional variations and 
differences between the three banking groups, with the state-owned savings banks 
providing the most even regional distribution of branches (Bresler et al. 2007, Wengler 
2005, p. 276). The first attempt to investigate the determinants of bank outreach on the 
regional level has been made by Wengler (2006) for banks in East Germany. For the year 
1998, he regressed geographic branch penetration of savings banks and big private banks 
as well as demographic deposit and loan penetration of savings banks on a number of 
explanatory variables. He found that economic wealth and population density had a 
significant positive influence on geographic branch penetration of private banks, in line 
with H1 and H2. In the case of savings banks, economic wealth had a negative effect on 
geographic branch penetration, and population density had a positive, but smaller effect 




larger financial access to poorer and less densely populated regions due to their public 
mandate. The branch density of savings banks is positively affected by bank size 
(supporting H4). The intensity of competition, measured by the branch density of other 
banking groups in the region did not influence geographic outreach. A positive effect of 
the branch density of cooperative banks on the outreach of savings banks indicates that 
both banking groups are following similar branch strategies (Wengler 2006, p. 286). 
Demographic deposit and loan penetration of savings banks decrease with population 
density and increase with economic wealth and geographic branch penetration. Thus, 
public savings banks contribute to higher savings and loans by a dense branch network. 
Moreover, demographic deposit penetration increases with the share of elder people in the 
population, indicating that savings banks are serving elder customers with a high demand 
for deposit services. The reverse result is found for demographic loan penetration, because 
elder people have a lower demand for bank loans. This supports the hypothesis that the 
outreach of small, decentralized banks increases with the demand for retail banking 
services (H5). The size of the bank relative to the population has a positive effect on 
demographic loan penetration, consistent with H4. 
V.  Univariate analysis 
1.  Bank outreach at the federal and federal state level 
The 16 federal states of Germany differ with respect to population density and economic 
wealth (measured by GDP per capita, disposable income and employment rates). Both 
tend to be higher in the South and the old federal states of West Germany than in the 
North and the new federal states of East Germany (Eurostat Regionaldaten 2008, 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2008). Thus, there is a gap between the South/West and 
North/East of Germany.  
With a total number of 75,188 million current accounts in Germany (2005)
5, the 
outreach indicator (1) ‘bank accounts per adult’ lies above one, indicating full access at 
the federal level. Within Europe, such high penetration rates with more than 90% of the 
population using a current account are only found in Germany, France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands (European Commission 2004, p.21). However, there are regional variations.  
                                                           




While in most of the federal states, less than 10% of the adults have no current account, 
the share of the excluded is higher in Northern than in Southern Germany (Media Spiegel 
2007). Bank outreach seems to increase with economic wealth, consistent with H1. Public 
savings banks are the leading provider of bank accounts, with a market share of 48%.
6 
This supports H6.  
To examine branch penetration (indicators (2) and (3)), we use 2003 data of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2007). Since 2004, data on the regional distribution of bank 
branches are no longer available. In 2003, the total number of bank branches in Germany 
was 47,244,
7 serving an area of 357,083 km² and a population of 82.5 million. Thus, the 
geographic branch penetration was 132 and the demographic branch penetration 57.2 at 
the federal level.
8 While this is high compared to other countries,
9 there are large 
differences in branch penetration among the federal states (see Table 2). The city states 
(Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen) show the lowest demographic, but highest geographic branch 
penetration, because of their comparatively high population density and small size. 
Among the larger federal states with low population density, the East German states 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Brandenburg have the lowest branch penetration. 
Table 2 shows a South-North and West-East gap. In the South, geographic branch 
penetration is almost twice as large as in the North (160 vs. 89 branches per 1,000 km²), 
and in the West, it is more than twice as large as in the East (159 vs. 63 branches per 
1,000 km²). Given the economic wealth gap between the South/West and North/East, 
these observations support H1. 
Table 2 also shows differences in branch penetration rates among the three banking 
pillars. For whole Germany, savings banks have the highest demographic and geographic 
branch outreach. The geographic branch penetration of the five big private banks is 
highest in the agglomerated regions of the city states (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg) and 
lowest in the least densely populated states (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania). There are West-East and South-North gaps, following the economic wealth 
gaps. Because private banks hold a larger number of branches in more densely populated 
areas, their demographic branch penetration does not vary much across federal states. The 
geographic branch penetration of the decentralized savings and cooperative banks also 
                                                           
6 Deutsche Bundesbank (2006d); DSGV (2006); own calculations. 
7 Including the Postbank AG (Deutsche Bundesbank 2007, p. 104). 
8 Own calculations, Statistisches Bundesamt (2008); Deutsche Bundesbank (2004). 
9 In 2005, demographic branch penetration was 53.4 in Germany, but only 29.6 in the EU-25 average (ECB 




tends to be higher in more densely populated states and in the West/South compared to the 
East/North, with cooperative banks being least concentrated on the city states. In East 
Germany, private banks show a higher branch penetration than the other groups. This may 
be due to the fact that the “Staatsbank” of the former German Democratic Republic with 
its large branch network was taken over by two big private banks in 1990. In all other 
regions (West, North, Middle South), branch penetration of savings banks exceeds that of 
private and cooperative banks, except in Southern Germany, where the cooperative banks 
show the highest outreach. 
Table 2 
Branch penetration at the federal state level for the three pillars of the banking system (2003) 
Federal State  Dem. branch penetration   Geo. branch penetration  
 All    I
1 II
2 III





4  60.2 19.6 17.9 15.6 159.1 51.7  47.3  41.1 
B.-
Württemberg  72.0 24.0 24.3 16.4 215.4 71.8  72.6  49.1 
Bavaria  73.4 22.2 25.7 18.9 129.2 39.1  45.3  33.3 
Bremen 37.9  14.9 3.8  10.1  620.9  244.9  61.8  165.7 
Hamburg 34.0  10.8 3.3  9.5  781.2  247.6  75.5  217.2 
Hesse  67.0 22.7 20.1 17.3 193.2 65.5  57.8  49.9 
N.R.-
Westphalia  43.5  14.5 9.9  11.8  230.7  77.1 52.7 62.7 
R.-Palatinate  73.9 26.3 23.6 18.6 151.2 53.7  48.3  38.1 
Saarland  72.0 25.5 23.9 17.1 297.4 105.5 98.9  70.5 
S.-Holstein  53.2  14.4 12.8  15.9  95.1 25.8 22.9 28.4 
East Germany
4  50.6  16.6 9.6  17.5  63.5 20.9 12.0 22.0 
Brandenburg  45.6  13.8 7.7  18.2  39.9 12.1 6.7  15.9 
M.-W. 
Pomerania  47.1 12.8 10.2 15.7 35.2  9.6  7.6  11.7 
Lower  Saxony 58.4  18.5 16.2  16.4  98.0 31.1 27.1 27.4 
Saxony  49.2  17.5 7.7  17.0  115.6  41.1 18.0 39.8 
Saxony-Anhalt  53.7  19.3 10.2  17.7  66.2 23.8 12.6 21.9 
Thuringia  57.5  18.0 14.0  18.8  84.4 26.3 20.5 27.6 
Berlin  25.9  6.9 2.7 8.2 984.5  263.5  102.0  312.8 
Northern 
Germany
5  52.4  16.0 12.8  15.1  89.2 27.3 21.8 25.7 
Middle Germany
6  47.9 15.9 10.7 14.1 134.0 44.6  30.1  39.6 
Southern 
Germany
7  72.9 23.6 24.8 17.9 159.9 51.7  54.4  39.2 
Whole  Germany  57.2 18.6 15.9 15.6 132.3 42.9  36.8  36.0 
1savings banks, including Landesbanken;  
2cooperative bank;, 
3big 
  private banks:  Deutsche Bank AG, 
Commerzbank AG, Dresdner Bank AG, Hypovereinsbank AG, Postbank AG;  
4without Berlin; 
5Bremen, 
Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein; 
6Berlin, Brandenburg, Hesse, 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia; 
7 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Rhineland-





Bank ATM data to calculate indicators (4) and (5) are only available at the federal level. 
In 2006, German banks served 82.3 million people on 357,083 km² with 53,887 ATMs. 
This yields a large demographic ATM penetration of 65.5, and geographic ATM 
penetration of 150.9.
10 Also debit card penetration is high: with a total number of 90.4 
million in 2006, the number of debit cards owned per person exceeds one. 48.7% of the 
debit cards are provided by savings banks, 27.1% by cooperative banks and 21.6% by 
private banks (Bundesverband deutscher Banken 2008). This supports H6. 
Data about the outreach of bank loans, measured by indicators (6) and (7), are not 
available for the German banking sector, except some survey data about the number of 
loans. According to a 2007 survey, only two loans were used by 11 inhabitants, which 
yields a demographic loan penetration of 18,182 (number of loans per 100,000 people).
11 
This is below the average of 50,000 in the richest countries, where every other uses a bank 
loan (Beck et al. 2006). Also here, there are regional variations at the federal state level, 
with the lowest demographic loan penetration in Saarland (12,500) and the highest in 
Saxony-Anhalt (28,571).
12 There seems to be a West-East and a South-North gap, with 
higher demographic loan penetration in the East/North than in the West/South of 
Germany. This does not indicate better loan access, but higher loan use in the East/North, 
as loan demand tends to be higher because of lower per capita incomes there. 
Since the loan-income-ratio cannot be calculated because of missing data about 
individual loan sizes, we calculate instead the ratio of the total loan volume to GDP at the 
federal state level. While a higher value of the loan-income-ratio defined in Table 1 
indicates worse access to smaller loans, a higher value of our loan-GDP-ratio indicates 
higher loan access or use. Table 3 shows this ratio for the 16 federal states in 2005. Again, 
there are large regional variations, with the highest loan-GDP-ratios in the West German 
states Hamburg and Hesse and the lowest ones in the East German states Brandenburg and 
Saxony-Anhalt. In contrast to the demographic loan penetration ratios above, there is a 
West-East gap, with the average loan-GDP-ratio in West Germany being more than twice 
as high as in East Germany (1.040 vs. 0.451). This may be due to lower loan sizes or 
higher credit rationing of East German firms, indicating worse access there (consistent 
                                                           
10 Own calculations, Bundesverband deutscher Banken (2008); Statistisches  Bundesamt (2008). For a 
comparison of demographic ATM penetration within the EU, see ECB (2007), p. 41. 
11 own calculations, Media Spiegel (2007). 





13 However, loan-GDP-ratios are higher in the North than in the South, 
consistent with the findings for demographic loan penetration.  
Table 3  
Loan-GDP-ratio and deposit-GDP-ratio at the federal state level (2005) 
Deposit volume
10 to GDP  Federal state  Loan volume
9 
to GDP 





4  1.04  0.99 0.28 0.20 0.15 
B.-Württemberg  1.04  0.99 0.26 0.25 0.07 
Bavaria  1.01  0.94 0.26 0.22 0.22 
Bremen  0.89  0.99 0.31 0.07 0.10 
Hamburg  1.49  0.89 0.24 0.06 0.18 
Hesse  1.51  1.72 0.26 0.20 0.36 
N.R.-Westphalia  0.81  0.80 0.31 0.17 0.10 
R.-Palatinate  0.99  0.92 0.35 0.28 0.06 
Saarland  0.73  0.76 0.33 0.22 0.06 
Schleswig-Holstein  1.11  0.96 0.26 0.15 0.11 
East Germany
4  0.45  0.59 0.33 0.10 0.08 
Brandenburg  0.38  0.59 0.32 0.09 0.07 
M.-W.  Pomerania 0.52  0.50 0.28 0.12 0.07 
Lower  Saxony  1.08  0.92 0.27 0.18 0.07 
Saxony  0.50  0.67 0.37 0.09 0.10 
Saxony-Anhalt  0.40  0.52 0.32 0.10 0.07 
Thuringia  0.43  0.55 0.32 0.11 0.08 
Berlin
5  1.02  1.05 0.29 0.13 0.19 
Northern Germany
6 1.11  0.89 0.27 0.14 0.10 
Middle Germany
7  0.89  0.96 0.31 0.16 0.16 
Southern Germany
8 1.01  0.95 0.27 0.24 0.14 
1savings banks; 
2cooperative banks; 
3big private banks:  Deutsche Bank AG, Commerzbank AG, 
Dresdner Bank AG, Hypovereinsbank AG, Postbank AG; 
4without Berlin; 
5Data of the Berliner 
Landesbank, the only bank belonging to the savings banks sector in Berlin; 
6Bremen, Hamburg, 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein; 
7Berlin, Brandenburg, Hesse, North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia; 
8Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Rhineland-
Palatinate, Saarland;  
9without loans to domestic public authorities; 
10 demand, time, and savings deposits, 
and savings certificates of domestic non-banks (without domestic public authorities); Source: Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2006e), Statistisches Bundesamt (2008), own calculations 
Access to loans is of particular importance to SMEs, which comprise 99.7% of all 
enterprises and 70.9% of all employees in Germany (IMF 2007). On the federal level, the 
share of savings banks in the SME loan market exceeds that of the other two banking 
groups: in 2005, savings banks provided 43.1%, private banks 16.2% and cooperative 
banks 14.5% of all SME loans. In the trade sector with mainly small firms, the market 
                                                           
13 For previous evidence showing an East-West gap in lending to small and medium-sized firms in Germany 




share of the savings banks reaches even 69.8% (DSGV 2006a, p. 9).
14 These observations 
are consistent with H6 and indicate that state-owned savings banks help to increase 
outreach in markets which are likely to fail due to asymmetric information.
15 
Also demographic deposit penetration (outreach indicator (8)) is high in Germany, with 
more than 75% of private households using a savings deposit in 2004. At the federal state 
level, we observe again a gap between the West/South and East/North of Germany. With 
84%, the share of households using a savings deposit is 6 percentage points higher in 
Western than in Eastern German states. It is highest in the Southern state of Bavaria 
(90%) and lowest in the Northern state of Schleswig-Holstein (74%) (Media Spiegel 
2007), consistent with H1. 
Similar regional variations apply to the deposit-GDP-ratio (outreach indicator (9)) 
shown in Table 3. With 0.99, the deposit-GDP-ratio in the West exceeds that in the East 
by 67%. It is lowest in the North with 0.89, followed by 0.95 in the South and 0.96 in 
Middle Germany.
16 Table 3 also shows the dominance of the savings banks in the deposit 
market. Only in Hesse, the location of the financial center Frankfurt/Main, the big private 
banks have a larger market share.
17 The credit cooperatives have large market shares in 
Southern Germany. The dominant positions of the savings banks are highest in the less 
wealthy states of the East (56.1%) and North (30%).
18 
Summing up, we find that although banking sector outreach is high in Germany, there 
are regional disparities showing both a West-East and a South-North gap regarding access 
to bank branches, ATMs and loans as well as use of bank accounts and deposits. Even if 
these descriptive statistics on the federal state level are crude, they tend to support the 
hypothesis that bank outreach increases with regional economic wealth. Comparing the 
three pillars of the German banking system, we find that public savings banks provide a 
larger loan and deposit penetration, and in most federal states also branch penetration, 
compared to private and cooperative banks. With their larger deposit penetration in the 
less wealthy Eastern and Northern regions, they tend to reduce regional disparities. 
                                                           
14 Savings banks are also leading the market of loans to private households, with a market share of 29.4% 
(own calculations, Deutsche Bundesbank 2006e). 
15 See also the KfW survey results (KfW 2006, p. 16 and 27). 
16 Own calculations, Deutsche Bundesbank (2006e), Statistisches Bundesamt (2007).  
17 Calculated by the ratio of savings banks deposit-GDP-ratio to all banks deposit-GDP-ratio. 
18 This is supported by bank customer surveys. In 2005, 39% of German bank depositors declared that 
savings banks were their first partner in asset formation, followed by cooperative banks with 19% and big 




2.  Bank outreach at the district level 
Looking at smaller regions or districts, we observe an uneven distribution of the 
population. In the OECD average, about a third of a country’s population is concentrated 
on only 10% of its regions. With 32%, Germany lies slightly below the average (OECD 
2005, p.21). To examine the distribution of the population in the 439 German districts, we 
use the classification of regions according to population density and size into 
agglomerated, urbanized and rural regions (BBR 2005). 
87% of the German population lives in agglomerated and urbanized regions, and 13% in 
rural regions. Compared to other OECD countries, the settlement in rural regions is 
relatively high, because they are close to the centers (OECD 2007, pp. 56). The regional 
distribution of GDP and economic wealth, however, is highly concentrated. In 2001, about 
67% of the German GDP was produced in urban regions, and only 16-17% in rural or 
intermediate regions (OECD 2005, pp. 26.) There are large variations in GDP per capita, 
disposable income and unemployment rates per district type. The highest GDP per capita 
and disposable income are obtained in cities and districts with high population density, the 
lowest ones in rural districts. Rural districts with low density have the highest average 
unemployment rate, especially in East Germany, where these districts are more highly 
concentrated and farer away from the centers (BBR 2005). To examine whether these 
regional gaps in economic wealth influence the regional distribution of bank branches, we 
calculate branch penetration rates at the district level. 
Table 4 shows geographic and demographic branch penetration for the three region 
types and pillars of the German banking system in 2001 and 2003, and the changes 
between both years. Regarding all banks, geographic branch penetration is highest in 
agglomerated regions (1) and lowest in rural regions (3). This is consistent with the 
hypotheses that bank outreach increases with economic wealth (H1) and population 
density (H2). The reverse holds for demographic branch penetration, which shows smaller 
regional differences. This can be explained by lower branch densities in districts with 
lower population density. From 2001 to 2003, both branch penetration rates declined by 9-
10%, with the largest declines in urbanized regions (2). Comparing the three pillars, 
savings banks have the highest, and private banks the lowest branch penetration rates in 
all regions. This supports H6. Only in rural regions, cooperative banks have a slightly 




Compared to savings and cooperative banks, private banks are more highly concentrated 
on agglomerated regions, where their geographic branch penetration is more than twice as 
high as in urban regions. From 2001 to 2003, branch penetration rates declined by 8% in 
the savings banks pillar, by 8-9% in the cooperative bank pillar and by 17-20% in the 
private bank pillar. The reduction rates in the first two pillars are below average in all 
three region types. Only in rural regions, cooperative banks reduced their branch 
penetration rates less than the other banking groups. 
Table 4 






   2001 2003 01/03
10 2001 2003 01/03
10 
Region type 1
1 385.6  350.9  -8.9  59.0  53.8  -8.8 
Region type 2
2 238.8  214.6  -10.1 80.8  72.0  -10.9 
Region type 3
3 190.3  174.7  -8.2  83.2  76.1  -8.5 
All




   Whole Germany
5 147.8  133.6  -9.6  68.1 61.4 -9.7 
Region type 1
1 128.7  119.5  -7.1  20.5  18.9  -7.9 
Region type 2
2 81.8 74.3 -9.1  26.9  24.1  -10.2 
Region type 3




   All
4 92.3  84.9  -7.9  24,0  22,0  -8.3 
Region type 1
1 87.4 80.1 -8.3  16.2  14.8  -8.8 
Region type 2
2 66.1 60.1 -9.1  26.7  23.9  -10.7 
Region type 3




   All
4 69.8  64.1  -8.2  23.5  21.2  -9.5 
Region type 1
1 41.0 32.3 -21.2 3.8  3.2  -17.4 
Region type 2
2 16.2 13.0 -19.7 3.0  2.4  -19.2 
Region type 3
3 23.0 19.5 -15.4 4.8  4.2  -13.9  III
9 
   All
4 26.1  21.0  -19.6  3.7  3.1  -17.0 
1agglomerated region (n=146); 
2urbanized region (n=188); 
3rural region (n=102); 
4without Berlin, 
Hamburg and Landkreis Ludwigshafen (included in the district Ludwigshafen am Rhein) (n=436); 
5 
(n=439); 
6private banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, Postbank, regional und other credit banks; 
7savings banks; 
8cooperative banks; 
9big private banks: Deutsche Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG, 
Hypovereinsbank AG, Commerzbank AG; 
10percent change from 2001 to 2003; source: Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2001-2003), BBR (2005), own calculations. 
These results are not directly comparable to those for the federal state level above (Table 
2), because they are based on a narrower classification of private banks. Here, the group 
of private banks includes only the four biggest banks, without the Deutsche Postbank 
AG.
19 The Deutsche Postbank holds a larger branch network than the four big banks, 
                                                           
19 The Deutsche Postbank AG is classified by the Deutsche Bundesbank within the group of the big private 




because it cooperates with the Deutsche Post AG, which has a public mandate to provide 
nationwide services. Therefore, Table 2 shows a larger branch penetration for the private 
banking pillar than Table 4.  
VI.  Multivariate analysis  
1.  Data set, measurements and method 
We employ multivariate analyses to test the hypotheses about branch penetration for 
savings and cooperative banks at the district level, using regional and bank-specific data. 
The regional data were taken from the data bases ‘Statistik regional’ (Statistische Ämter 
2006) and ‘INKAR’ (BBR 2005). Bank-specific data were obtained from DSGV (2006b) 
and BVR (2005). Comparable data for private banks are not available. 
To combine regional and bank-specific data, a region should correspond to a bank’s 
business district. In the case of savings banks, this applies to most districts and 
independent cities, which incurred the guarantor liability of ‘their’ savings bank until 
2005.
20 In those cases, in which the business district of a savings bank comprises more 
than one region (district or independent city), we aggregated these regions. In those cases, 
in which a region comprises the business districts of several savings banks, we aggregated 
these banks. The resulting data set covers almost 95% of all  savings banks (463 in 2005) 
and almost 90% of all districts and independent cities of Germany for the period 2001-
2005. 
For the cooperative banks (1,262 in 2005), geographic market delineation is less clear. 
Because of the mission to promote their members, cooperative banks are also regionally 
bounded, however less strictly than public savings banks. Data about the business areas of 
German cooperative banks are missing. We define the business district of a cooperative 
bank as the region (district or independent city), in which the bank’s headquarter is 
located. In those cases, in which more than one bank is assigned to a region, these banks 
are aggregated. The resulting data set comprises 97% of all cooperative banks and 87% of 
all districts and independent cities of Germany in 2005. Data about the number of 
branches per cooperative bank are not available. We used the bank branch statistics of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2001-2003), which contain the number of branches per banking 
                                                           




group at the district level until 2003. These data were extrapolated until 2005 by using the 
available rates of changes at the federal level. 
Table 5 
Definition, measurements and descriptive statistics of variables (2005) 






Number of savings bank 




Number of cooperative bank 
branches per 1.000 km²  59 (48)  44  362 
Demographic branch 
penetration (I)
 1  
Number of savings bank 
branches per 100.000 
inhabitants 




Number of cooperative bank 
branches per 100.000 
inhabitants 
21 (18)  13  362 
Branch market share (I)
 1  Number of savings bank 
branches per competitor 
branches (DSGV 2006b) 
0.85 (0.77)  0.47  283 
Branch market share (II)
 2  Number of cooperative bank 
branches per competitor 
branches (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2005, extrapolated 
from 2003 with federal trend) 
0.49 (0.48)  0.23  362 
Independent variables        
Population density (I)
 1  Number of inhabitants per km²  400 (175)  606  283 
Population density (II)
2  Number of inhabitants per km²  450 (200)  559  362 
Economic wealth (I)




(16,929)  7,866 283 
Economic wealth (II)
 2  available household income per 






 1  Percent of inhabitants aged 75 
or more  8.3 (8.2)  1   283 
Share 75+ (II)
 2  Percent of inhabitants aged 75 
or more 
8.3 (8.2)  1 362 
Competition (I)
 1  Number of competitor branches 
per savings bank branches 
(DSGV 2006b) 
1.4 (1.3)  0.6  283 
Competition (II)
 2  Number of competitor branches 
per cooperative bank branches 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2005, 
extrapolated from 2003 with 
federal trend) 
2.6 (2)  1.6  362 
Bank size (I)
 1  Average volume of savings 
bank assets per capita   12.2 (11.7)  4.5  283 
Bank size (II)
 2  Average volume of cooperative 
bank assets per capita   7.2 (6.2)  6  362 
1Savings banks; 
2  cooperative banks; 
3  standard deviation;
 4 number of observations; source: own 
calculations. 
                                                           
21 Purchasing power or disposable household income are better proxies for potential demand than GDP per 
capita (used by Wengler 2006), if people do not live in the region where they work, commuting to neighboring 




Our main dependent variables in multivariate regressions are geographic and 
demographic branch penetration. Additionally, we use branch market shares to examine 
group differences in branching strategies. As independent variables we use economic 
wealth, population density, share of elder people, competition, and bank size. The variable 
definitions and descriptive statistics are listed in Table 5. All variables are taken in 
logarithmic form within linear OLS estimations. Thus, the regression coefficients are 
elasticities indicating the percentage change of the dependent variable if the independent 
variable changes by one percent, ceteris paribus. 
2.  Regression results  
The regression results for geographic branch penetration of savings banks (2001, 2005) 
and cooperative banks (2005) are reported in Table 6. Economic wealth shows a highly 
significant positive influence on branch penetration of both groups, indicating that they 
are profit- or efficiency-oriented (H1). The difference in the magnitude of the influence 
cannot be interpreted because of different measurements. The results remain robust to 
replacing the independent variable purchasing power per capita by GDP per capita and 
splitting the sample into East and West Germany. They contrast to those of Wengler 
(2006), who found that GDP per capita had a significant negative effect on the branch 
penetration of savings banks in East Germany in 1998. 
Population density exerts a highly significant positive influence on geographic branch 
penetration of savings and cooperative banks, with elasticities of 0.73 and 0.78 (2005). 
Thus, both kinds of regional banks provide less branches per km² in less densely 
populated regions, according to the efficiency goal (H2). Since this reaction is less than 
proportional, the number of branches per inhabitant is higher in less densely populated 
regions. Comparable regressions for demographic branch penetration yield the same 
results for all independent variables, except a negative influence of population density.
22 
Hence, small, decentralized banks provide a larger number of branches per inhabitant in 
less densely populated regions, serving the inhabitants’ demand for retail banking 
services. Wengler (2006) also found an elasticity of geographic branch penetration with 
respect to population density smaller than one for the case of savings banks, but larger 
than one for the case of big private banks in East Germany in 1998 
                                                           
22 The elasticities of geographic and demographic branch penetration with respect to population density sum 





 Regression results (OLS): dependent variable ln(geographic branch penetration) 
  Savings Banks  Cooperative Banks 






Ln(economic  wealth)  0.72*** 0.50*** 0,32*** 
Ln(population density)  0.68***  0.73*** 0.78*** 
Ln(share  75+)  0.55*** 0.42*** 0.72*** 
Ln(competition)  -0.42*** -0.28*** -0.94*** 
Ln(bank  size)  0.37*** 0.52*** 0.08*** 
Constant  -12.77*** -12.22*** -3.73*** 
R
2  0.92 0.91 0.93 
*** p ≤ 1 %; 
** p ≤ 5 % 
* p ≤ 10 %;  (White) heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors; tested for normal 
distribution of error terms and multicollinearity; source: own calculations. 
Branch penetration of savings and cooperative banks is significantly higher in regions 
with a larger share of elder people. The share of the elderly may be a proxy for the 
demand for retail banking services. In Germany, today’s seniors are the most wealthy age 
group with a high demand for bank deposits (Grabka/Krause 2005). They are less likely to 
use direct banking, preferring personal contact and advice at a local bank branch. Thus, 
we find support for H5. On the other hand, elder people have lower demand for loans than 
younger people. The age structure may also be a proxy for a region’s economic activity or 
attractiveness, which influence migration flows. In rural or regions with a declining 
population, the share of elder people is higher than in industrial or dynamic regions 
attracting young people. The large impact of the share of the elderly on the branch 
penetration of cooperative banks may partly reflect their concentration on rural regions.  
Banking competition has a significant negative effect on the branch penetration of both 
groups, in line with H3. The elasticity is much lower for savings banks (–0.28) than for 
cooperative banks (–0.94). This indicates that savings banks fulfill their public mission to 
serve all regions, fostering competition.  
Branch penetration of both groups increases significantly with bank size, in line with 
H4. This corresponds to the results of Wengler (2006) and indicates again that public 
savings banks pursue the goal of economic efficiency beyond their public mission. The 
smaller elasticity in the case of cooperative banks may be due to their smaller size, which 
restrains the possibility to reap economies of scale by establishing  additional branches.  
To examine the explanatory power of the single variables, we performed univariate 




play a very minor role. The signs and significance levels of the regression coefficients are 
the same as in Table 6, except for the variable competition loosing its influence in the case 
of savings banks. This is another hint to their public mission. 
Table 7 
Regression results (OLS): dependent variable ln (branch market share) 
  Savings Banks  Cooperative Banks 






Ln(economic  wealth) -0.42*** -0.60*** 0.88*** 
Ln(population density)  0.028  -0.035  -0.32*** 
Ln(share 75+)  0.170  0.67***  -0.12*** 
Ln(bank  size)  0.25*** 0.29*** 0.19*** 
Constant  3.01*** 6.78*** 3.86*** 
R
2  0.08 0.17 0.58 
*** p ≤ 1 %; 
** p ≤ 5 % 
* p ≤ 10 %;  (White) heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors; tested for normal 
distribution of error terms and multicollinearity; source: own calculations 
To investigate whether the branching strategy differs between savings and cooperative 
banks, we regressed the branch market shares on regional economic variables and bank 
size. The results are presented in Table 7. An increase in economic wealth has a 
significant negative influence on the branch market share of savings banks, while the 
reverse holds for cooperative banks. This indicates that due to their public mission, 
savings banks maintain a higher branch penetration in less wealthy regions, compared to 
all other banks. Population density has no significant effect on the market share of savings 
banks, but a significant negative effect on that of cooperative banks. This may reflect that 
cooperative banks concentrate on less densely populated rural regions, while savings bank 
branches are most evenly distributed. The share of elder people has a positive influence on 
the branch market share of savings banks, indicating that they specialize on retail deposit 
customers (consistent with H5). This does not hold for cooperative banks. The branch 
market shares of both groups increase with bank size, as expected. All together, the 
independent variables explain 58% of the variation in the market shares of cooperative 
banks, but only 17% of those of savings banks. Thus, the branching policy of savings 
banks is less dependent on regional economic factors, due to their public mission. The 





VII.  Conclusions 
The present paper tried to explain geographic and demographic outreach of the German 
banking system. After a review on the conceptual framework and theoretical literature we 
derived hypotheses on the determinants of bank outreach for profit- or efficiency-oriented 
banks and savings banks with a public mission. These were confronted with evidence for 
German banks. A review of the empirical literature revealed a research gap with respect to 
studies on the regional level. While in international comparisons the German banking 
sector shows a high outreach performance, the distribution of banking services over 
smaller regions and the three pillars of the banking sector has not been thoroughly 
investigated so far. The present paper yields two contributions to close this gap: first, it 
examines different outreach measures at the federal state and district levels for the three 
banking pillars by univariate analyses. Secondly, it seeks to explain the branch penetration 
of the regional savings and cooperative banks in all German districts by multivariate 
analyses.  
Our main results are as follows. First, all three banking groups – private, public savings 
and cooperative banks – show a broader outreach in economically wealthy and more 
densely populated regions. This is economically efficient and the result of higher demand 
for banking services when household income and the number of customers are higher. 
However, due to their public mission, savings banks maintain a higher branch penetration 
in less wealthy regions, compared to all other banks. With their comparatively large 
branch, deposit and loan penetration in less wealthy and less densely populated regions, 
public savings banks help to reduce regional disparities in access to and use of banking 
services within Germany. 
Secondly, public savings banks provide a broader outreach to retail banking customers 
than private banks, holding dominant positions in deposit and SME loan markets. Due to 
their decentralized organization and regional principle, they help to reduce information 
and transaction costs by relationship banking close to the customers. In regions with a 
larger share of elder people, savings and cooperative banks provide more branches than in 
“younger regions”, serving customers who need personal contact and advice. Savings 
banks show a higher specialization on ‘elder regions’ than cooperative banks. 
Third, because of their public mission to serve all regions, savings banks foster 




private or cooperative banks may help them to cover the costs of fulfilling their public 
mandate. 
In sum, our results show that the German three-pillar banking system performs well in 
providing nationwide banking services. They support microeconomic theories of banking, 
which explain welfare benefits of a division of labor between large, centrally organized 
private banks and small, de-central savings and cooperative banks. The regional principle 
and public mandate of savings banks seem to contribute to the goal of equal living 
standards across German regions, which show large disparities in economic wealth and 
population density. Thus, we support the recent recommendation of the German Council 
of Economic Advisors to maintain the regional principle and public mandate of the 
German savings banks (Sachverständigenrat 2008).
23 However, the present study is only a 
first step to explain differences among the three banking pillars in providing access to 



















                                                           
23 Moreover, the Sachverständigenrat (2008) recommends to transform the state-owned savings banks into 
stock corporations in the majority ownership of foundations. The question whether this would improve the 
performance of the German banking system is beyond the scope of the present paper. While gains in economic 






Univariate regression results (OLS): dependent variable ln(geographic branch penetration)  of savings 
banks 2005 
Independent variables  N = 283 
Ln(economic  wealth)  1.32***      
Ln(population 
density)   0.82***     
Ln(share  75+)   1.52***    
Ln(competition)     0.007   
Ln(bank  size)     1.39*** 
R
2  0.23 0.77 0.04 0.001  0.32 
*** p ≤ 1 %; 
** p ≤ 5 % 




Univariate regression results (OLS): dependent variable ln(geographic branch penetration)  of 
cooperative banks 2005 
Independent variables  N = 362 
Ln(economic  wealth)  2.08***      
Ln(population density)    0.56***     
Ln(share  75+)    0.51***    
Ln(competition)     -
0.18*** 
 
Ln(bank  size)      0.47*** 
R
2  0.30 0.54 0.007  0.01 0,23 
*** p ≤ 1 %; 
** p ≤ 5 % 





 Univariate regression results (OLS): dependent variable ln(branch market share) of savings banks 2005 
Independent variables  n=283 
Ln(economic wealth)  -0.39***       
Ln(population  density)   -0.04    
Ln(share 75+)      0.82***   
Ln(bank  size)     -0.11*** 
R
2  0.09 0.008  0.05 0.009 
*** p ≤ 1 %; 
** p ≤ 5 % 










 Univariate regression results (OLS): dependent variable ln(branch market share) of cooperative banks 
2005 
Independent variables  n=362 
Ln(economic wealth)  0.84***       
Ln(population density)    -0.26***    
Ln(share 75+)      -0.90***   
Ln(bank  size)     0,25*** 
R
2  0.11 0.27 0.05 0.14   
*** p ≤ 1 %; 
** p ≤ 5 % 
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